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StriatumDecision-making invokes two fundamental axes of control: affect or valence, spanning reward and punish-
ment, and effect or action, spanning invigoration and inhibition. We studied the acquisition of instrumental
responding in healthy human volunteers in a task in which we orthogonalized action requirements and out-
come valence. Subjects were much more successful in learning active choices in rewarded conditions, and
passive choices in punished conditions. Using computational reinforcement-learning models, we teased
apart contributions from putatively instrumental and Pavlovian components in the generation of the ob-
served asymmetry during learning. Moreover, using model-based fMRI, we showed that BOLD signals in stri-
atum and substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA) correlated with instrumentally learnt action
values, but with opposite signs for go and no-go choices. Finally, we showed that successful instrumental
learning depends on engagement of bilateral inferior frontal gyrus. Our behavioral and computational data
showed that instrumental learning is contingent on overcoming inherent and plastic Pavlovian biases,
while our neuronal data showed this learning is linked to unique patterns of brain activity in regions impli-
cated in action and inhibition respectively.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Optimal decision-making requires choices that maximize reward
and minimize punishment. Animals are endowed with two broad clas-
ses of mechanisms to achieve this optimization. Firstly, hard-wired, or
Pavlovian, policies directly tie affectively important outcomes, together
with learned predictions of those outcomes, to valence-dependent ste-
reotyped behavioral responses. Secondly, a more ﬂexible, instrumental,
controller learns choices on the basis of contingent consequences
(Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). These controllers generally favor the
same choices, thereby rendering learning fast and efﬁcient. However,
their underlying workings are best revealed by striking sub-optimalities
that ensue when they come into opposition (Boureau and Dayan, 2011;
Breland and Breland, 1961; Dayan et al., 2006).uroscience, University College
ip).
.
 license.One abundant source of sub-optimalities is the substantial interde-
pendence of two logically independent axes of behavioral control
(Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cools et al., 2011; Gray and McNaughton,
2000; Niv et al., 2007): a valence axis running from reward to punish-
ment, and an action axis running from vigor to inhibition. Pavlovian re-
sponses associated with predictions of reward usually entail vigorous
active approach and engagement (Gray and McNaughton, 2000), irre-
spective of the instrumental validity of these actions. Equally, Pavlovian
responses to (at least distal possible) punishments are generally associ-
ated with behavioral inhibition (Blanchard and Blanchard, 1988; Gray
and McNaughton, 2000; Soubrie, 1986).
The functional architecture of the basal ganglia, a region known to
support instrumental control, reﬂects the same association between af-
fect and effect. For example, the so-called “direct pathway” promotes go
choices in light of provided rewards while the “indirect pathway” pro-
motes no-go choices in light of foregone rewards (Frank and Fossella,
2011; Gerfen, 1992). Further, the same dual association may also be
expressed within ascending monoaminergic systems (Cools et al.,
2011). Thus, the dopaminergic system is involved in generating active
motivated behavior (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Niv et al., 2007;
Salamone et al., 2007) and instrumental learning through reward
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nergic system seems to be more closely afﬁliated with behavioral inhi-
bition in aversive contexts (Crockett et al., 2008; Dayan andHuys, 2009;
Soubrie, 1986).
Previous human studies on instrumental learning and decision mak-
ing have generally exploited a conventional coupling between reward
and go choices (e.g. Frank et al., 2004; O'Doherty et al., 2004). By contrast,
various groups, including ourselves, have taken a different approach to
decision-making, using tasks that fully orthogonalize action and valence
in a balanced 2 (reward/punishment)×2 (go/no-go) design (Crockett
et al., 2009; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). These latter tasks reveal that
Pavlovian value expectations can disrupt instrumental performance,
with anticipation of punishment impairing active go responses. Howev-
er, the studies concerned considered steady-state behavior in a stable
world, and did not examine learning. This is a critical omission, since
the interaction between action and valence could boost, or indeed pre-
vent learning altogether, and since the neural substrates of acquisition
and maintenance could be quite different — as indeed has been claimed
for action learning (Atallah et al., 2007; Everitt et al., 2008).
Here, we designed a variant of our previous task (Guitart-Masip
et al., 2011) to examine Pavlovian inﬂuences on instrumental learn-
ing of go and no-go choices to maximize gains and minimize losses.
This question has generally been studied using Pavlovian to instru-
mental transfer paradigms involving separate Pavlovian and instru-
mental training phases prior to a transfer phase in which the effects
of Pavlovian stimuli on instrumental performance are tested in ex-
tinction (Cardinal et al., 2002; Huys et al., 2011; Parkinson et al.,
1999; Talmi et al., 2008). Our task, instead, involves the instrumental
learning of active and passive choices (go or no-go) in contextswhere ei-
ther wins or losses are probabilistically realized. Therefore, the expected
Pavlovian effects are incidental. The task structure allows a detailed com-
putational analysis of Pavlovian and instrumental inﬂuences during
learning while retaining the orthogonalization of reward/punishment
and go/no-go of our original task.
We hypothesized that learning of the optimal action choice (go or
no-go) would be affected by the value of the choice outcomes. This
would result from an interference arising out of state values or the
expected value generated by the fractal images (Pavlovian controller)
on the learned instrumental choice values for go and no-go options
(Instrumental controller). In our task action and state values are indis-
tinguishable from each other using fMRI because these values are highly
correlated in some of the conditions. However, we envisaged that the
neural correlates of action values for go and no-go choices would be af-
fected by the states in which these actions are required. We expected
that action values for go and no-go choices would be differentially
expressed in the win and avoid losing conditions in brain areas impli-
cated in the realization of a behavioral interaction between action and
valence in our task.We surmised that this interaction should be evident
in the striatum and amygdala, guided by previous studies implicating
such regions in Pavlovian inﬂuences on instrumental choice (Cardinal
et al., 2002; Parkinson et al., 1999; Talmi et al., 2008). Finally, as we
also observed a value independent action bias in choices, we predicted
that brain areas involved in inhibiting prepotent responses such as the
inferior frontal gyrus (Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Robbins, 2007) would
be involved in no-go performance.
In accordance with previous accounts of the involvement of the stria-
tumand SN/VTA in instrumental learning,we show that themagnitude of
activity in striatum and SN/VTA parametrically tracked instrumental ac-
tion values. Critically, we show that the sign of relationship between ac-
tion value and striatal and SN/VTA activity depended on the vigor status
of the behavioral choice, being positive for go actions and negative for
no-go actions. For instance, a larger expected reward for a no-go action
was coupled to less activity in both striatumand SN/VTA,whereas a larger
expected reward for a go actionwas coupled tomore activity in the same
structures. Moreover, we exploited the fact that a signiﬁcant subset of
participants did not acquire accurate instrumental responses for allconditions to characterize the differential neural responses in those par-
ticipants that showed successful instrumental performance in our task.
Materials and methods
Subjects
47 adults participated in the experiment (28 females and 19 males;
age range 18–35 years; mean 23.1, SD=4.1 years). 17 subjects per-
formed the experiment outside, and 30 subjects, inside the scanner. All
participants were healthy, right-handed and had normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity. None of the participants reported a history of
neurological, psychiatric or any other current medical problems. All sub-
jects provided written informed consent for the experiment, which was
approved by the local ethics board (University College London, UK).
Experimental design and task
We used a modiﬁed version of an experimental design we previ-
ously employed to disentangle the effects of action and valence in an-
ticipatory responses in the striatum and the SN/VTA post learning
(Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). Here we are addressing learning of
state-action contingencies. Each trial consisted of three events: a frac-
tal cue, a target detection task and a probabilistic outcome. The trial
timeline is displayed in Fig. 1. In each trial, subjects saw one of four
abstract fractal cues for 1000 ms. The fractal cues indicated whether
a participant would subsequently be required to perform a target de-
tection task by emitting a button press (go) or not (no-go). The fractal
also instructed subjects as to the possible valence of any outcome
consequent on the subject's behavior (reward/no reward or punish-
ment/no punishment). The meaning of the fractal images was ran-
domized across participants.
Following a variable interval (250–2000 ms) after offset of the frac-
tal image, the target detection task commenced. The target was a circle
displayed on one side of the screen for 1500 ms. Participants had
1000 ms in which they indicated, via a key press, the side on which
the cue was presented. If they chose to do so, and if they chose the cor-
rect side, the response was classiﬁed as “go”. 1000 ms after the offset of
the circle, subjects were presented with the outcome. The outcome
remained on screen for 1000 ms: a green arrow pointing upwards indi-
cated a win of £1, a red arrow pointing downwards indicated a loss of
£1, and a yellow horizontal bar indicated no win or loss. The outcome
was probabilistic, in win trials 80% of correct choices and 20% of incor-
rect choiceswere rewarded (the remaining20% of correct and80% of in-
correct choices leading to no outcome), while in lose trials 80% of
correct choices and 20% of incorrect choices avoided punishment.
Thus, there were 4 trial types depending on the nature of the fractal
cue presented at the beginning of the trial: press the correct button in
the target detection task to gain a reward (go to win); press the correct
button in the target detection task to avoid punishment (go to avoid los-
ing); do not press a button in the target detection task to gain a reward
(no-go to win); do not press a button in the target detection task to
avoid punishment (no-go to avoid losing). Unlike Guitart-Masip et al.
(2011), in the current experiment, subjectswere not verbally instructed
about the action contingencies for each fractal image and had to learn
them by trial and error. Participants were instructed that the correct
choice for each fractal image could be either go or no-go. They were
also instructed about the probabilistic nature of the task. Those partici-
pants that performed the task inside the scanner learned the task con-
tingencies as they were being scanned.
Our task separated instrumental responses (go and no-go choices to
the targets) from the fractal images that indicate action requirements
and outcome valence in order to dissociate anticipatory brain responses
from responses elicited by execution of an actual motor response. How-
ever, unlike our previous experiment (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011), in the
current experiment all trials included both a target detection task and
Fig. 1. Experimental paradigm.On each trial one of four possible fractal images indicated the combination between action (making a button press in go trials or withholding a button
press in no-go trials) and valence at outcome (win or lose). Actions were required in response to a circle that followed the fractal image after a variable delay. On go trials, subjects
indicated via a button press on which side of the screen the circle appeared. On no-go trials they withheld a response. After a brief delay, the outcome was presented: a green
upward arrow indicated a win of £1, and a red downward arrow a loss of £1. A horizontal bar indicated of the absence of a win or a loss. On go to win trials a correct button
press was rewarded, on go to avoid losing trials a correct button press avoided punishment, in no-go to win trials a correct withholding a button press led to reward, and in
no-go to avoid losing trials a correct withholding a button press avoided punishment. The schematics at the bottom represent for each trial type, the nomenclature to the left,
the possible outcomes and their probability after a correct response to the target (go choice) in the middle, and the possible outcomes and their probability after withholding a
response to the target (no-go choice) in the right.
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responses uniquely associated with action anticipation, but ensured
that the learning processwas not confounded by any attempt to decorr-
elate these two factors. The anticipatory response of an action before ac-
tual execution of any motor component involves action invigoration
and is likely to be associatedwith thedeployment of cognitive resources
(attention and sensory process) that allow a directing effect on the spe-
ciﬁc action being prepared. This dual association of motoric and cogni-
tive components that interact to sculpt a motor response is a general
mechanism that allows adaptive interactions with the environment.
Assessing the extent to which invigoration of action, and the associated
deployment of distinct cognitive resources, can be attributed speciﬁcally
to the observed anticipatory responses in the midbrain/basal ganglia
network goes beyond the immediate goals and scope of the present
study.
The task included 240 trials, 60 trials per condition and was di-
vided into four 9 min sessions (15 trials per condition). Subjects
were told that they would be paid their earnings of the task up to
a total of £35. Before starting with the learning task, subjects did20 trials of the target detection task in order to get familiarized
with the speed requirements.
Behavioral data analysis
The behavioral data were analyzed using the statistics software
SPSS, version 16.0. The number of correct choices in the target detec-
tion task (correct button press for go conditions and correct omission
of responses in no-go trials) was collapsed across time bins of 10 tri-
als per condition. These measures were analyzed with a three way
repeated-measures ANOVA with time, action (go/no-go) and valence
(win/lose) as factors. In an initial analysis we also included group (in-
side the scanner/outside the scanner) as a between-subject factor.
Reinforcement learning models
We built six parameterized reinforcement learning models to ﬁt to
the behavior of the subjects. All the models assigned each action at on
trial t a probability. This was based on an action weight W(at,st) that
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squashed softmax (Sutton and Barto, 1998):
pðat stj Þ ¼
expðWðat stj Þ
∑a′ expðW a′ stj Þ
 
" #
1−ξð Þ þ ξ
2
ð1Þ
where ξ was the irreducible noise which was kept at 0 for one of the
models (RW), butwas free to vary between 0 and 1 for all othermodels.
The models further differed in terms of how the action weight was
constructed. For models RW and RW+noise, W(a,s)=Q(a,s), which
was a simple Rescorla–Wagner like update equation:
Qt at ; stð Þ ¼ Qt−1 at ; stð Þ þ ε ρrt−Qt−1 at ; stð Þð Þ ð2Þ
where ε was the learning rate. Reinforcements entered the equation
through rt∈{−1,0,1} and ρwas a free parameter that determined the ef-
fective size of reinforcements for a subject. For model RW(rew/pun)+
noise+bias, the parameter ρ could take on different values for the re-
ward and punishment trials, but for all other models there was only one
value of ρ per subject. This meant that those models assumed that loss
of a reward was as aversive as obtaining a punishment.
The other models differed in the construction of the action weight
in the following way. For model RW+noise+Q0, the initial Q value
for the go action was a free parameter, while for all other models
this was set to zero. For models that contained a bias parameter, the
action weight was modiﬁed to include a static bias parameter b:
Wt a; sð Þ ¼ Qt a; sð Þ þ b if a ¼ goQt a; sð Þ else
:

ð3Þ
For the model including a Pavlovian factor (RW+noise+bias+
Pav), the action weight consisted of three components:
Wt a; sð Þ ¼ Qt a; sð Þ þ bþ πVt sð Þ if a ¼ goQt a; sð Þ else

ð4Þ
Vt stð Þ ¼ Vt−1 stð Þ þ ε ρrt−Vt−1 stð Þð Þ ð5Þ
where π≥0 was again a free parameter. Thus, for conditions in which
feedback was in terms of punishments, the Pavlovian parameter
inhibited the go tendency in proportion to the negative value V(s)
of the stimulus, while it similarly promoted the tendency to go in con-
ditions where feedback was in terms of rewards.
Model ﬁtting procedure
These procedures are identical to those used by Huys et al. (2011),
but we repeat them here for completeness. For each subject, each
model speciﬁed a vector of parameters h. We found the maximum a
posteriori estimate of each parameter for each subject:
hi ¼ argmaxh p Ai ; hij Þ p hi θj Þðð ð6Þ
where Ai comprised all actions by the ith subject. We assumed that
actions were independent (given the stimuli, which we omit for nota-
tional clarity), and thus p(Ai|hi) factorized over trials, being a product
of the probabilities in Eq. (1). The prior distribution over the param-
eters p(hi|θ) mainly served to regularize the inference and prevent
parameters that were not well-constrained from taking on extreme
values. We set the parameters of the (factorized) prior distribution
θ, which consist of a prior mean m and variance v2, to the maximum
likelihood given all the data by all the N subjects:
θ^ML ¼ argmaxθp A θj Þð ð7Þ
¼ argmaxθð∏N
i
∫dNhipðAi hij Þpðhi θj ÞÞ ð8Þwhere A={Ai}i=1N comprised all the actions by all theN subjects and θ=
{m,v2} were the prior mean and variance. This maximization was ap-
proximately achieved by Expectation–Maximization (MacKay, 2003).
We used a Laplacian approximation for the E-step at the kth iteration:
pðh Ai;j Þ≫N h kð Þi ; s
kð Þ
i
 
ð9Þ
h kð Þi ¼ argmaxhpðAi ;hj Þpðh θ k−1ð ÞÞ
 ð10Þ
where N(⋅) denotes a normal distribution and ∑ i(k) is the second
moment around hi(k). This resulted in the following updates for the
group-level parameters θ={m,v2}:
m kð Þ ¼ 1
N
∑
i
h kð Þi ð11Þ
v kð Þ
 2 ¼ 1
N
∑
i
h kð Þi
 2 þ S kð Þi
 	
− m kð Þ
 2
: ð12Þ
Before inference, all parameters were suitably transformed to en-
force constraints (log and inverse sigmoid transforms). All model ﬁtting
procedures were veriﬁed on surrogate data generated from a known
decision process.
Model comparison
Models would ideally be compared by computing the posterior log
likelihood logp(M|A) of each model M given all the data A. As we had
no prior on the models themselves (testing only models we believed
were equally likely a priori), we instead examined the model log like-
lihood logp(M|A) directly. This quantity could be approximated in
two steps. First, the integral over the hyperparameters was approxi-
mated using the Bayesian Information Criterion at the group level
(Kass and Raftery, 1995):
log pðA Mj Þ ¼ ∫dθp A θj Þp θMj Þðð ð13Þ
≫−1
2
BIC int ¼ log pðA θ^ML −12 Mj j log Aj jð Þ: ð14Þ
Importantly, however, logp A θ^ML
  was not the sum of individual
likelihoods, but the integral over the individual parameters.We approx-
imated this integral by sampling from the ﬁtted priors:
log pðA θ^ML  ¼∑
i
log∫dhpðAi ;hj Þp h θ^ML
  ð15Þ
≫∑
i
log
i
K
XK
k¼1
p Ai h
k
  ð16Þ
where Kwas set to 1000 and hkwere parameters drawn independently
from the priors over the parametersp h θ^ML
  . Thesemodel comparison
procedures were also veriﬁed on surrogate data generated from a
known decision process. Comparing integrated BIC values is akin to a
likelihood ratio test, and in fact can be shown to reduce to classical sta-
tistical tests for certain simple linear models (Kass and Raftery, 1995).
fMRI data acquisition
fMRI was performed on a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra magnetic reso-
nance scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany)with echo planar imaging
(EPI). Functional datawas acquired in four scanning sessions containing
135 volumes with 41 slices, covering a partial volume that included
the striatum and the midbrain (matrix: 128×128; 40 oblique axial
slices per volume angled at −30° in the antero-posterior axis; spatial
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volume included the whole striatum, the SN/VTA, the amygdala, and
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. However, it excluded the medial
cingulate cortex, the supplementary motor areas, the superior frontal
gyrus, and the middle frontal gyrus. The fMRI acquisition protocol was
optimized to reduce susceptibility-induced BOLD sensitivity losses in
inferior frontal and temporal lobe regions (Weiskopf et al., 2006). Six
additional volumes at the beginning of each series were acquired to
allow for steady state magnetization and were subsequently discarded.
Anatomical images of each subject's brain were collected using multi-
echo 3D FLASH for mapping proton density (PD), T1 andmagnetization
transfer (MT) at 1 mm3 resolution (Weiskopf and Helms, 2008) and by
T1 weighted inversion recovery prepared EPI (IR-EPI) sequences (spa-
tial resolution: 1×1×1 mm). Additionally, individual ﬁeld maps were
recorded using a double echo FLASH sequence (matrix size=64×64;
64 slices; spatial resolution=3×3×3 mm; gap=1mm; short TE=
10ms; long TE=12.46 ms; TR=1020 ms) for distortion correction
of the acquired EPI images (Weiskopf et al., 2006). Using the FieldMap
toolbox (Hutton et al., 2002) ﬁeld maps were estimated from the phase
difference between the images acquired at the short and long TE.
fMRI data analysis
Datawere analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre forNeuroim-
aging, UCL, London). Pre-processing included realignment, unwrapping
using individual ﬁeldmaps, and spatial normalization to the Montreal
Neurology Institute (MNI) space with spatial resolution after normaliza-
tion of 1×1×1mm. We used the uniﬁed segmentation algorithm avail-
able in SPM to perform normalization. This has been shown to achieve
good intersubject co-registration for brain areas such as caudate, putamen
and brain stem (Klein et al., 2009). Finally, data was smoothed with a
6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The fMRI time series data were high-
pass ﬁltered (cutoff=128 s) and whitened using an AR(1)-model. For
each subject a statistical model was computed by applying a canonical
hemodynamic response function (HRF) combined with time and disper-
sion derivatives (Friston et al., 1998).
Separate general linear models (GLMs) were ﬁt to the data to
address two distinct questions. First, we wanted to identify the neural
underpinnings for the interaction between action and valence that
we observed at the behavioral level. The computational model sug-
gested this is related to an interaction between action and state
values. Although the BOLD signal associated with these two values
is indistinguishable in our paradigm, we hypothesized that an inter-
ference mediated by action and state values would be realized in an
interaction between contextual valence (whether a trial had a posi-
tive or a negative state value) and action values for go and no-go
choices. Therefore, our ﬁrst GLM asked whether brain representations
of instrumental values inferred from behavior, as per our best-ﬁtting
computational model, were dependent on the vigor status of the ac-
tion (go versus no-go) and on the motivational setting (reward or
punishment feedback). Second, we hypothesized that anticipatory re-
sponses to the fractal images would differ between those participants
that successfully learned the experimental conditions and those that did
not. Moreover, as we also observed a value independent action bias, we
hypothesized that brain areas involved in inhibiting preponderant
responses such as the inferior frontal gyrus (Aron and Poldrack, 2006;
Robbins, 2007) would be involved in no-go performance. To address
these questions, our secondGLMwas implemented to analyze the effects
of action and valence anticipation (2×2 factorial design) during the
anticipatory phase (fractal image), without using action values employed
in the ﬁrst GLM analysis.
GLM 1: effects of expected valence on the representation of action values
(model-based analysis)
We built a general linear model that included 4 different conditions:
2 at the onset of the fractal images (anticipatory phase); and 2 at theonset of the outcome. At the onset of the fractal images, and at outcome
onset, trials were divided into those with a positive expected value (go
to win and no-go to win) and those with a negative expected value (go
to avoid losing and no-go to avoid losing). The onset of fractal images
wasmodeled using a boxcar that extended in time during thewhole an-
ticipatory phase until the target detection task was presented. Impor-
tantly, each of the onset regressors was parametrically modulated by
two separate and independent regressors: one parametric regressor in-
cluded the value of the go action (Qt(go)) and the other the value of the
no-go action (Qt(no-go)). We modiﬁed the standard procedure imple-
mented in SPM in order to prevent automatic orthogonalization of con-
secutive parametric regressors. These time-varying action values were
updated according to Eq. (2) using the posterior learning rate for the
winning model. This amounted to four parametric regressors in total
for the anticipatory phase responses. During the outcome phase, each
of the two conditions (positive and negative expected value conditions)
was parametrically modulated by two independent regressors: one in-
cluded the raw outcome value (0 or 1 for win trials; and 0 or−1 in lose
trials) and the other included the state value Vt(s) as inferred by the
model. Again, this resulted in a total of four parametric regressors for
outcome phase responses. To capture residual movement-related arti-
facts, six covariates were included (the three rigid-body translations
and three rotations resulting from realignment) as regressors of no in-
terest. Two subjects had to be excluded from analysis because it was
not possible to use their regressor for Qt(no-go) in the win trials as
they did not make enough no-go choices to generate sufﬁcient variance
for the values to be used as a parametric modulator. Notice that these
two participants show a selective poor performance for the no-go to
win condition, as the performance in the other 3 conditions was higher
than 80% in both cases.
To test for the effects of valence on different representations of
action values, regionally speciﬁc condition effects were assessed by
employing linear contrasts for each subject and each parametric condi-
tion (ﬁrst-level analysis). The resulting contrast images were entered
into a second-level random-effects analysis and the hemodynamic
effects of each parametric conditionwere assessed using a 2×2 analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with the factors ‘action’ (Q go/Q no-go), and
valence (win/lose).
To test for the presence of reward prediction errors at the time of
the outcome as well as effects of valence on outcome processing, re-
gionally speciﬁc condition effects were tested by employing linear
contrasts for each subject and each parametric condition (ﬁrst-level
analysis). The resulting contrast images were entered into a second-
level random-effects analysis and the hemodynamic effects of each
parametric condition were assessed using a one way analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with four levels: raw outcome value in win trials, raw
outcome value in lose trials, expected value in win trials, expected
value in lose trials.
GLM 2: neural correlates of successful instrumental control
Webuilt a secondgeneral linearmodel that included our 4 conditions
of interest as separate regressors at the onset of the fractal images: go to
win trials, go to avoid losing trials, no-go towin trials, and no-go to avoid
losing trials. We also modeled the onset of the target detection task sep-
arately for trials in which subjects emitted (or did not emit) a button
press. Note we intentionally included these two regressors in order to
explain away variance associated with the performance of the motor
response in the anticipatory phase responses. We also included, as a re-
gressor, the onset of the outcome (which could again be win £1, lose £1,
or no monetary consequence). To capture residual movement-related
artifacts, six covariates were included (the three rigid-body translation
and three rotations resulting from realignment) as regressors of no
interest.
A heterogeneity in the expression of instrumental learning across
subjects is well established (Schonberg et al., 2007). This was also the
case here, with some subjects performing well in all conditions and
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advantages in that it allowed us to explore brain responses associated
with appropriately successful instrumental control. To deﬁne successful
instrumental controlweused an arbitrary threshold of 60% correct trials
across the whole experiment, and 80% correct in the second half of the
experiment in every condition, enabling us to segregate subjects into
learners (19/30) and non-learners (11/30). These criteria ensured par-
ticipants classiﬁed as learners showed satisfactory instrumental learn-
ing in all four conditions (see supplemental Fig. S1). When we applied
the same criteria to those participants that performed the task outside
the scanner, we found that the proportion of learners was 7/17. A chi
square test did not detect any differences in the frequency of learners
between the two groups (χ2=2.16,ns).
We analyzed neural representations of valence (win/lose) and ac-
tion (go/no-go) anticipation elicited by presentation of fractal images,
independently from value representations. We focused on the time
point at which the fractal stimuli were presented, prior to the presen-
tation of the target that occasions a behavioral response. We ﬁrst fo-
cused our analysis on the learners because they were likely to
anticipate the correct action in all conditions, reﬂecting successful in-
strumental control. We then conducted a separate analysis comparing
anticipatory responses between learners and non-learners to detect
whether the pattern of activated areas found in the learners was spe-
ciﬁc to those subjects showing successful instrumental control.
To test for the effects of action and valence anticipation in learners,
we tested for regionally speciﬁc condition effects in linear contrasts for
each subject and each condition (ﬁrst-level analysis). The resulting con-
trast images were entered into a second-level random-effects analysis
and the hemodynamic effects of each condition were assessed using a
2×2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the factors ‘action’ (go/no-go),
and valence (win/lose). To test for differences in the effects of action
and valence anticipation between learners andnon-learnerswe comput-
ed, at the ﬁrst level, the parameter estimate of the main effect of action
contrast [(go to win+go to avoid losing)−(no-go to win+no-go to
avoid losing)] and the main effect of valence contrast [(go to win+
no-go towin)−(go to avoid losing+no-go to avoid losing)]. The result-
ing contrast images were entered into a second-level random-effects
analysis and the differences between the two groups (learners and
non-learners) were assessed using a two sample t-test.Regions of interest
Predicted activations detected in our voxel-based analysis were
corrected for multiple comparisons using small volume correction
(SVC) within anatomically deﬁned regions of interest: these com-
prised the striatum, the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and the substan-
tia nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA) of the midbrain (main
origin of dopaminergic projections). A priori, we also included the
amygdala but as we did not observe any active voxel there, this ROI
is not reported any further. The striatum and the IFG regions of inter-
est (ROIs) were deﬁned using the MNI templates available in Marsbar
(Brett et al., 2002); the striatum ROI included the caudate and the
putamen, whereas the IFG ROI included the pars trigeminalis and
the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus. The SN/VTA ROI
was manually deﬁned, using the software MRIcro and the mean MT
image for the group. On MT-images the SN/VTA can be distinguished
from surrounding structures as a bright stripe (Bunzeck and Duzel,
2006). It should be noted that in primates, reward responsive do-
paminergic neurons are distributed across the SN/VTA complex
and it is therefore appropriate to consider the activation of the en-
tire SN/VTA complex rather than, a priori, focusing on its subcompart-
ments such as the VTA (Duzel et al., 2009). For this purpose, a resolution
of 1.5 mm3, as used in the present experiment, allowed a sampling over
200 voxels of the SN/VTA complex, which has a volume of 350 to
400 mm3.Results
Reward and punishment differently affects go and no-go choices
The optimal choice on both “go to win” and “go to avoid losing”
trials is to go. Conversely, the optimal choice is not to emit an action
in “no-go to win” and “no-go to avoid losing” trials. Figs. 2A–D
show raw and average choice probabilities for all subjects. The
group learning curves for each of the four conditions show that sub-
jects did learn in all four conditions, but learning was far from equiv-
alent across trial types. A three way ANOVA on the number of correct
(optimal) choices with factors time (6 time bins of 10 trials each), ac-
tion (go/no-go) and valence (win/lose) as repeated factors revealed a
main effect of time (F(5,225)=31.16, pb0.001), a main effect of ac-
tion (F(1,45)=14.51, pb0.001), and an action by valence interaction
(F(1,45)=40.15, pb0.001), but no main effect of valence (F(1,45)=
1.64, p=0.21). Note that overall, the percentage of trials in which
subjects responded incorrectly in the target detection task (that is
left when the target was on the right, or alternatively right when the
target was on the left) was less than 0.1%. This result shows that partic-
ipants had no problem solving the detection task accurately and, most
importantly, that the effects of action and valence in our task cannot
be explained by incorrect target detection task performance.
Thus, our raw behavioral data indicate that while subjects were
equally good at learning from rewards and punishments, they
showed better performance in conditions requiring a go choice than
in trials requiring a no-go choice. Importantly, participants were bet-
ter at learning to go in the reward condition (compared to go in the
punishment condition), and were better at learning to withhold a re-
sponse (no-go) in the punishment condition (compared to a similar
response in the reward condition). This pattern was also evident in
the total number of correct choices as a function of each condition
(Fig. 2E, post-hoc paired t-tests, t(46)=4.85, pb0.001 and t(46)=
5.08, pb0.001, respectively). Combined, these results constitute
evidence for a striking interdependence of action and valence where
rewards preferentially support learning of active go choices, and pun-
ishments preferentially support learning of no-go choices. These results
cannot be accounted for by the asymmetries among trial types inherent
to our experimental design, because the interaction that we found
between action and valence is orthogonal to them. Whereas go and
no-go conditions differ in the levels of cognitive effort because the go
choices require a target detection task that is irrelevant for no-go
choices, this difference cannot explain why participants reverse the
level of accurate choices for go and no-go conditions depending on
the valence of the outcomes. Similarly, whereas the objective expected
value of a correct choice is lower in the avoid losing conditions, this dif-
ference cannot account for different effects of this difference on go and
no-go choices.
There was no interaction between the two groups of subjects
performing the task inside and outside the scanner: group by action
(F(5,45)=1.23; p=0.28), group by valence (F(1,45)=0.41; p=0.56),
group by time (F(5,225)=1.23; p=0.3), or group by action by valence
interaction (F(1,45)=1.42; p=0.22). Consequently, the two groups
were pooled in the computational analyses detailed below. By pooling
the data from both behavioral experiments we increased the power of
the expectation maximization-based ﬁtting procedure (see Materials
and methods for details).
Action bias, instrumental learning, and Pavlovian responses compete for
behavioral control
Reinforcement learning (RL) models can parameterize a ﬁne-grained
account of the interaction between action and valence as agents learn the
reward structure of the environment. We adapted the parameters of a
nested collection of models incorporating different instrumental and
Pavlovian RL hypotheses to the observed behavioral data, and compared
Fig. 2. Observed and modeled behavioral performance.(A–D) Learning time courses for all four conditions. Each row of the raster images shows the choices of one of the 47 subjects
in each of the four conditions. Go responses are depicted in white and no-go responses are depicted in grey. The overlaid black lines depict the time varying probabilities, across
subjects, of making a go response. The colored lines show the same time-varying probabilities, but evaluated on choices sampled from the model (see Materials and
methods).(E) Mean percentage of correct responses in each of the four conditions. Green error bars depict the 95% conﬁdence interval (CI) and the red error bars depict standard
error of the mean (SEM). Post hoc comparisons were implemented by means of repeated measures t-test: *pb0.005.(F) Integrated Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) score for all
models tested. All models are modiﬁed Q-learning model with two pairs of action-values (go and no-go) for each state (fractal image). The winning model includes as free parameters a
learning rate, a slope of the softmax rule, irreducible noise, a constant bias factor added to the action-value for go, and a Pavlovian factor that adds a fraction of the current state value to the
action-value for go.
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(Bayesian Information Criterion) that takes an appropriately conserva-
tive account of the number of parameters used (see Materials and
methods for details). Since we sought group inferences, and used the
same model for all subjects in the imaging analyses, we compared the
models at the group level, penalizing complexity after integrating out
(by sampling) individual model parameters (see Materials and
methods). We also generated surrogate data from the models by
using the subjects' a posteriori parameters and simulating behavior in
the task.
The base model was purely instrumental Q-learning devoid of any
valence interaction (Model RW in Fig. 2F). This used a Rescorla–Wagner
update rule to track the action value of each choice given each fractal
image (Qt(go) and Qt(no-go)) independently. On each trial t, the model
only updated the value of the action chosen on that trial. The probability
of choosing the go action on trial t was a sigmoid function of the differ-
ence between the action values scaled by a slope parameter.
Even in the best condition (i.e. go to win; see Fig. 2A), subjects
continued to make errors (albeit at a low rate) after reaching an early
asymptote. We found that augmenting model RW with an irreducible
action noise (Model RW+noise in Fig. 2F; see Talmi et al., 2009) im-
proved our measure of parsimony BICint (integrated Bayes information
criteria) (Fig. 2F). Surrogate data generated from RW+noise are
shown in light blue in Figs. 2A–D.
However, these models still failed to capture an initial bias that sub-
jects invariably exhibited toward performing the target detection task
(in Figs. 2A–D, the initial probability of a go choice was always >0.5).
Consequently, we tested two alternative models to account for this ef-
fect: ﬁrstly, we included an initial shaping bonus (Ng et al., 1999) that
could be naturally erased as the subjects learned (Model RW+noise+
Q0 in Fig. 2F); or, secondly, we included a bias that was constant across
the experiment (Model RW+noise+bias in Fig. 2F). The BIC measure
favored the latter. Indeed the model's simulated behavior matched the
true behavior better, particularly in the early stages (green lines in
Figs. 2A–D).However, the model RW+noise+bias still failed to capture the
crucial action by valence interaction, as is clearly evident in the ﬁg-
ures, for example in the no-go to win condition. Thus, we tested a fur-
ther model that added a Pavlovian approach/withdrawal component
to the other, instrumental, components. In this model, the probability
of a go action was incremented proportionally to the overall (action-
independent) state value of each stimulus. This model assumed that
increasing reward expectancy induced a parametric increase in go
probability, and that increasing punishment expectancy induced a
parametric increase in no-go probability. For example, consider the
no-go to win condition: as subjects learned to withhold their re-
sponses during the task, the stimulus indicative of this condition
came to be associated with more reward. This positive expectancy,
in turn, promoted a (inappropriate) go action. Similarly, the stimulus
indicating the go to avoid losing condition embodied a negative ex-
pectation (even when a subject was always right, due to probabilistic
feedback). In the model, this negative expectancy promoted inhibi-
tion of the requisite go choice. In both cases, we hypothesized that
this Pavlovian factor would account for the pattern of action/valence
interactions we observed, since on the one hand it should produce
the very interference with performance in those critical conditions
where action and valence were not aligned, while on the other
hand it should support behavior in those conditions where action
and valence were aligned.
Indeed, we found that this latter model (Model RW+noise+bias+
Pav in Fig. 2F) provided the most parsimonious account of our data.
Surrogate choices generated from the model showed that it accurately
captured crucial differences in learning across conditions. This model
predicted the choices of 43/47 subjects better than chance (binomial
test, pb .05, geometric mean predictive probability 8×10−11). Finally,
we veriﬁed that the asymmetry was not due to differences in reward
and punishment sensitivity by assessing a model with separate parame-
ters for each (Model RW(rew/pun)+noise+bias in Fig. 2F).
Thus, our computational analysis strongly suggested that three factors
contributed to the control of choice behavior during action-valence
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(the RW component), which we refer to as an Instrumental controller.
Second, we found evidence for a strong and persistent bias toward emit-
ting a go choice. Lastly, we found evidence for a Pavlovian coupling
between action and valence expectation.
Instrumental action values are represented in the striatum and the SN/
VTA
It would be conventional to have found a correlation between the
fMRI BOLD signal in areas involved in decision-making, such as the
striatum, and the values or propensities for choices, such as Qt(go)
and Qt(no-go). However, the strong Pavlovian effects observed in
the model suggested an effect of valence (winning versus avoiding
losing) on the coding of action values or, concomitantly, an effect of
action (go versus no-go) on the coding of predictions of valence. To
assess the former, we created separate parametric regressors associ-
ated with Qt(go) in the two valence conditions, and separate para-
metric regressors associated with Qt(no-go) in the same two valence
conditions. We then performed a voxel based 2×2 ANOVA on the re-
gression coefﬁcients. This showed a signiﬁcant main effect of action
(go versus no-go; see Fig. 3) in the left ventral putamen [Montreal Neu-
rological Institute (MNI) space coordinates (x,y,z) −24,0,−2; peak Z
score=5.61; p=0.001 FWE], and bilateral SN/VTA [MNI space coordi-
nates (x,y,z) 7,−16,−13; peak Z score=3.96; p=0.005 FWE SVC; MNI
space coordinates (x,y,z) −6,−18,−12; peak Z score=3.78; p=0.01
FWE SVC]. Note that this main effect of action is different from a simple
comparison between trials requiring go and no-go choices. Instead, this
main effect of action involves a comparison between separate action
values for go and no-go choices on every trial.Fig. 3. Action value representation in the striatum and SN/VTA.(A–B) The striatum (A) and t
uncorrected; pb0.05 SVC). The color scale indicates T values.(C–D) Parameter estimates of th
(D) showing that BOLD signal increased as the value of the go choice (Q go) increased both
no-go choice (Q no-go) increased, (note these parameter estimates were not used for statiA main effect of action implies that there was a signiﬁcant differ-
ence between the regression coefﬁcients associated with Qt(go) and
Qt(no-go), but the test is agnostic as to the sign of the correlation be-
tween BOLD signal and the parametric regressors. Strikingly SPM
parameter estimates in the activated clusters revealed that, through-
out the previously highlighted brain areas, action values for the go
choices (Qt(go)) were positively related to BOLD responses, while ac-
tion values of a no-go choice (Qt(no-go)) were negatively related with
BOLD responses. This differential implementation of go and no-go ac-
tions is evidence that a system involving the striatum and SN/VTA
mediates behavioral control via a bi-directional binding of action
value and vigor.
Neither of the other two facets of the 2×2ANOVAwas signiﬁcant, i.e.,
therewas neither amain effect of valence nor an action by valence inter-
action. Given the tight coupling between action values and Pavlovian
values in our task (but see below for additional analysis of this issue),
the lack of a main effect of valence suggested that we failed to ﬁnd a
locus coding for valence that could realize the Pavlovian effects revealed
by our computational model. Future reﬁnement in experimental design
might enable detection of just such a segregated system, as indeed has
been previously observed (Balleine et al., 2009), including in our labora-
tories (Dayan and Daw, 2008; Guitart-Masip et al., 2010; Talmi et al.,
2008). A ﬁnal point worthy of note is that we did not ﬁnd any brain
region coding for action values independent of action.
For completeness, we also report the responses to the outcome
although we do not discuss them in detail. A brain area reporting
reward prediction errors should have positively correlated with the raw
outcome value and simultaneously negatively correlated with expected
value.Wedid notﬁnd any brain area inwhich BOLD responses correlated
(positively or negatively)with expected value at the timeof the outcome.he SN/VTA (B) show higher representation of Qgo when compared to Qno-go (pb0.001
e four parametric regressors at the peak coordinate in the left putamen (C) and SN/VTA
in the win and lose trials. On the other hand, BOLD signal decreased as the value of the
stical inference).
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outcomeboth in thewin and the lose trials in the ventral striatum includ-
ing the nucleus accumbens [MNI space coordinates (x,y,z) 12,6,−11;
peak Z score>7; pb0.001 FWE] and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
[MNI space coordinates (x,y,z) −7,45,−13; peak Z score=7.14;
pb0.001 FWE]. This result suggested that these brain areas responded
when an outcomewas better than expected, that is awin in thewin trials
and the avoidance of a loss in the losing trials.
Recruitment of SN/VTA and IFG is related to successful instrumental
control
Figs. 4A–B show a voxel based 2×2 ANOVA with factors of action
(go and no-go) and valence (win and lose) restricted to the learners
on the brain responses elicited by presentation of fractal images (an-
ticipation) and independent from value representations. There was
no main effect of valence or an action by valence interaction within
the striatum, the SN/VTA, or the IFG. However, the analysis revealed
a simple main effect of ‘action’ (go>no-go) in a sole cluster that
survived SVC within our anatomical SN/VTA ROI located in left lateral
SN/VTA [MNI space coordinates −10,−17,−13; peak Z score=3.38;
p=0.041 FWE SVC]. Furthermore, on the same analysis, subjects clas-
siﬁed as learners revealed a complementary main effect of inaction
(no-go>go) (Figs. 5A–B) in left IFG pars opercularis [MNI space coor-
dinates −43,8,14; peak Z score=5.68; pb0.001 FWE SVC], right IFG
pars trigeminalis [MNI space coordinates 48,38,9; peak Z score=
4.66; p=0.009 FWE SVC] and left IFG pars trigeminalis [MNI space
coordinates −45,31,4; peak Z score=4.38; p=0.027 FWE SVC].
Importantly, these patterns of BOLD responses differentiated learners
from non-learners. A separate voxel based two-sample t-test involving a
‘go>no-go’ contrast between learners and non-learners also revealed a
cluster of activation that survived SVC within our a priori SN/VTA ROIFig. 4. Action anticipation in learners and comparison to non-learners.(A) In learners, stimu
(SN/VTA) activity than stimuli indicating no-go trials (pb0.001 uncorrected; pb0.05 SVC). T
left lateral SN/VTA show activation at this location signals anticipation of action regardless
space. Error bars indicate SEM (note that these parameter estimates were not used for sta
learners from non-learners in the magnitude of the contrast go versus no-go (pb0.001 unc
the peak coordinates in the left lateral SN/VTA show that only in subjects that learned, the
indicating no-go trials. Coordinates are given in MNI space. Error bars indicate SEM (note t(Figs. 4C–D). This cluster located to the same coordinates (left lateral
SN/VTA [MNI space coordinates −10,−17,−13; peak Z score=3.33;
p=0.054 FWE SVC]) and showed higher parameter estimates for the
learners. Thus, remarkably, both analyses highlight the same peak
voxel, suggesting that the left SN/VTA is speciﬁcally recruited in go trials
for subjects who successfully learn and who (one assumes by learning)
anticipate the appropriate choice (go or no-go) upon presentation of
the relevant fractal images.
Finally, a separate voxel based two sample t-test comparing themag-
nitude of the ‘no-go>go’ contrast between learners and non-learners,
we found three clusters of activation within an IFG anatomical ROI that
survived SVC (Figs. 5C–D). These were located in close proximity to the
foci of activation detected for the ‘no-go>go’ contrast in the learners:
the left IFG pars opercularis [MNI space coordinates−53,11,13; peak Z
score=4.77; p=0.008 FWE SVC], the right IFG pars trigeminalis [MNI
space coordinates 46,35,5; peak Z score=4.68; p=0.011 FWE SVC]
and the left IFG pars trigeminalis [MNI space coordinates −45,32,4;
peak Z score=4.26; p=0.055 FWE SVC]. Note that the sign for the
main effect of ‘no-go>go’ contrast in the non-learners is negative,
suggesting a qualitative rather than just a quantitative difference in the
pattern of activity in the IFG between learners and non-learners.
Discussion
We report a striking asymmetry for instrumental learning, where-
by participants were better at learning to emit a behavioral response
in anticipation of reward, and better at withholding a response in an-
ticipation of punishment. A computational analysis revealed that this
corruption of instrumental action learning could be accounted for in
terms of an inﬂuence of a Pavlovian learning system. The striatum
and the SN/VTA tracked action values for both choices, but with oppo-
site signs for go and no-go. This ﬁnding points to value representationli indicating go trials elicited greater left lateral substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area
he color scale indicates T values.(B) Parameter estimates at the peak coordinates in the
of outcome valence (reward or punishment avoidance). Coordinates are given in MNI
tistical inference).(C) In an independent comparison, left lateral SN/VTA distinguishes
orrected; p=0.05 SVC). The color scale indicates T values.(D) Parameter estimates at
task fractal images indicating go trials elicited higher BOLD activity than fractal images
hat these parameter estimates were not used for statistical inference).
Fig. 5. Inhibition anticipation in learners and comparison to non-learners.(A) In learners, stimuli indicating no-go trials elicited greater bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) activity
than stimuli indicating go trials (pb0.001 uncorrected; pb0.05 SVC). The color scale indicates T values.(B) Parameter estimates at the peak coordinates in both IFG clusters show
that activation at these locations signals a requirement for inhibition regardless of the trial outcome valence (reward or punishment avoidance). Coordinates are given in MNI space.
Error bars indicate SEM (note that these parameter estimates were not used for statistical inference).(C) In an independent comparison, bilateral IFG distinguishes learners from
non-learners in the magnitude of the contrast no-go versus go (pb0.001 uncorrected, pb0.05 SVC). The color scale indicates T values.(D) Parameter estimates at the peak coordinates
in the clusters depicted in C show that only in subjects that learned the task, fractal images indicating no-go trials elicited higher BOLD activity than fractal images indicating go trials.
Coordinates are given in MNI space. Error bars indicate SEM (note that these parameter estimates were not used for statistical inference).
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the speciﬁcation of the chosen behavior (go or no-go). Finally, selec-
tive recruitment of left SN/VTA and bilateral IFG was coupled to the
emergence of successful instrumental control. The overall pattern of
ﬁndings highlights a mandatory coupling between valence and action
at the behavioral level that contrasts with a dominance of vigor con-
trol at the neurobiological level.
The datawe report help reﬁne the conception of Pavlovian inﬂuences
over instrumental control as well as the architecture of instrumental
decision-making itself. We note that our participants performed an ap-
parently trivial task that entailed learning a simple relationship between
four fractal images and a highly restricted behavior repertoire (go or a
no-go choice). As the probability of reaping a reward or avoidance of a
punishment was much higher for correct (0.8) than incorrect choices
(0.2) one might expect rapid and ﬂuent learning equivalent across all
conditions. The striking ﬁnding that subjects, as a group, were impaired
in this simple form of learning is testament to the strength and potential
perniciousness of biases and asymmetries built into the architecture of
decision-making. Furthermore, these effects persisted throughout a rela-
tively lengthy learning period, and defeated optimizing instrumental
learning mechanisms in a non-trivial fraction of our subjects.
Our computational modeling revealed that a key asymmetry in learn-
ing came from a coupling between valence and vigor. This coupling is
central to classical Pavlovian to instrumental paradigms where the pre-
sentation of the Pavlovian stimulusmodiﬁes the vigor of instrumental re-
sponses in a valence dependent manner (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002;
Huys et al., 2011; Talmi et al., 2008). That is, go was favored in conditions
where there was a possibility of winning money and no-go when there
was a possibility of losing, while the alternative mappings were difﬁcult.
This pattern of behavioral ﬁnding is consistent with a number of well-
known results such as negative automaintenance (Dayan et al., 2006;
Williams and Williams, 1969). Such deep embedding of strong biaseswithinﬂexible instrumentalmechanismsmay serve to alleviate computa-
tional costs of learning. Conversely, such biases may also lie at the root of
many anomalies of decision-making (Dayan et al., 2006; Guitart-Masip
et al., 2010). Interestingly, the deleterious effects of punishment on go
choices, but not the deleterious effects of reward on no-go choices, were
also observed in our previous study (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). In that
study we used a similar paradigm but with the crucial difference being
that participants were both instructed about contingencies and over-
trained to reach high levels of accuracy on the go/no-go choices. One pos-
sibility suggested by this is that the certainty as to the correct choice may
affect Pavlovian inﬂuences on action selection elicited by reward differ-
ently from those elicited by punishment.
Most previous human studies of learning have focused on two condi-
tions that our subjects found straightforward: i.e., go towin and no-go to
avoid losing (e.g. Cools et al., 2009; Frank et al., 2004; O'Doherty et al.,
2004). A prevalent view is that dopamine projections to target struc-
tures, including the striatum (McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al.,
2003; Pessiglione et al., 2006), express reward prediction error signals
(Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Schultz et al., 1997) in the form of phasic
bursts for positive prediction errors and dips below baseline for negative
prediction errors (Bayer et al., 2007). The striatum then uses increases in
dopamine to reinforce the direct pathway and generate go choices, while
dips in dopamine reinforce the indirect pathway and generate no-go
choices (Frank et al., 2004; Wickens et al., 2007). This functional archi-
tecture provides a plausible mechanism for instrumental learning of ac-
tive responses through positive reinforcement and passive responses
through punishment. Here, by passive we mean that they do not in-
volve the generation of any overt behavioral responses. Crucially, in
these straightforward conditions, instrumental and Pavlovian control-
lers prescribe the same action and are thus indistinguishable.
An instrumental system of this sort embodies an asymmetry since
it provides no clear mechanism for learning to go in order to avoid
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mechanisms treat conditions such as active avoidance by coding the
removal of possible punishment as akin to a reward (Maia, 2010;
Moutoussis et al., 2008; Mowrer, 1947). In support of this view,
whereas dopamine deﬁcits impair acquisition and maintenance of ac-
tive avoidance behavior (Darvas et al., 2011; McCullough et al., 1993),
learning about the prospect of punishment can occur even when do-
pamine is compromised (Beninger and Phillips, 1981). This implies
that dopamine is required to learn a requirement for active responses
to avoid punishment but another system learns about punishment it-
self. Serotonin has been suggested as being involved in coding for as-
pects of punishment or punishment prediction errors, although this is
far from certain (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cools et al., 2011; Daw
et al., 2002). If two stages are indeed involved in learning active
avoidance, then this could also contribute to the observed behavioral
asymmetry.
In line with the above view, our fMRI results showed that the stri-
atum and the SN/VTA tracked action values for both go and no-go
choices but that the relationship between value and brain activity
was positive for go and negative for no-go. These results extended
our recent observation that during anticipation, activity in striatum
and lateral aspects of the SN/VTA complex reﬂect action requirements
rather than state values (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). It may be that
both structures are part of an integral instrumental system that
learn the value of available behavioral options, but where coding is
relative to the control of vigor and approach. However, caution
should be exercised in interpreting the lack of a conventional value
signal in the striatum and the SN/VTA, as our experimental design
did not allow us to search for such a signal in the current experiment.
Conversely, despite a clear effect of valence on action learning, we
did not ﬁnd any effect of valence on action value representations. This
negative result does not imply that the observed behavioral asymme-
try was not realized in the brain. It may arise as an example of the sort
of malign valence-induced bias in learning that induces risk sensitiv-
ity (Denrell, 2007; March, 1996; Niv et al., 2002). That is, consider the
no-go to win condition. If some participants happened to obtain re-
ward for an early trial in which they performed a go response, they
might continue performing go inﬂexibly, without sampling no-go.
As both the Pavlovian and a value independent action bias favor the
performance in the go to win condition, a reverse inﬂexible perfor-
mance of an early rewarded no-go, is unlikely to manifest. Future ex-
periments should be designed to dissociate state and action values.
This would require that these two values are not highly correlated
in the way there were in the current experiment. A possible strategy
for future examination of this would be to include forced trials with-
out choices, but only outcomes.
We also did not see any BOLD signals consistent with a prediction
error at the time of the outcome. Since prediction errors are highly
correlated with the reward term of the prediction error, and to ensure
that a region is reporting a reward prediction error in a given task, it is
necessary to separate the reward prediction in its two components,
that is the reward and the value expectation (Behrens et al., 2008).
In the current experiment, we followed this principle and only
found a correlation between BOLD and the reward term at the time
of the outcome. Similar results, in which prediction errors are not ap-
parent, have previously been reported (Behrens et al., 2008; Li and
Daw, 2011). Reconciling these results with those showing prediction
errors (Daw and Doya, 2006) is an important task for the future. One
possibility is that prediction errors in the striatum are only observed
when prediction errors are of behavioral relevance for the instrumen-
tal task at hand (Klein-Flugge et al., 2011; Li and Daw, 2011). In the
present task, the actual value of the stimuli was irrelevant for the in-
strumental task as instrumental choices could be informed with the
reward component itself. In other context where participants may
need to compare the relative value of different options, the full pre-
diction error may be necessary for optimal instrumental performanceas previously reported (e.g. Glascher et al., 2010; O'Doherty et al.,
2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Schonberg et al., 2007).
The decrease in activity within the striatum and SN/VTA as no-go
choice value increased does not ﬁt the classical view of cortico-striatal
circuits, in which reward promotes the direct (go) pathway and the
punishment promotes the indirect (no-go) pathway (Frank et al.,
2004; Hikida et al., 2010). Instead, a supplementary mechanism
seems to be required. Indeed, we observed that during anticipation,
before subjects actually performed a behavioral response (go or no-
go), only subjects who learned the no-go to win condition recruited
bilateral IFG in trials requiring inhibition of a go choice. Given the
functional anatomy of IFG, it is interesting to speculate that those
who learned the task did so by overcoming dominant go response
tendencies, as for example when presented with a reward predicting
fractal image that mandated a no-go choice. The same would be true
for the no-go-to-avoid losing condition if as suggested by the model,
participants must learn to overcome a value independence bias to-
ward go choices in this task. Recruitment of IFG is systematically asso-
ciated with an ability to stop a preponderant motor response (Aron
and Poldrack, 2006; Robbins, 2007), or when there is a need to slow
down in a decision task involving response conﬂict (Fleming et al.,
2010).
Similarly, only participants who learned the appropriate choices in
all conditions selectively recruited the left SN/VTA in trials requiring a
go choice, suggesting that an inability to restrict such SN/VTA responses
to go trials is related to a failure in learning task contingencies. We ob-
served a similar pattern of activations in our previous study, in which
the participants had such extensive training as to behave akin to
learners during the second part of the experiment in the current task
(Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). Within the limitation of fMRI studies of
the SN/VTA (Duzel et al., 2009), this pattern is consistentwith a sugges-
tion that dopamine plays a role in action preparation and invigoration
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Niv et al., 2007; Salamone et al., 2007),
a role complementary to its established role in representing a reward
prediction error.
Non-learners failed to acquire appropriate behavior in conditions
where the choices prescribed by a Pavlovian controller were inappro-
priate. This echoes recent evidence regarding individual differences in
decision-making, and most particularly a prominent distinction be-
tween sign-tracking and goal-tracking in rodents (Flagel et al., 2010;
2011). Just as for our non-learners, Pavlovian inﬂuences are dominant
for sign-trackers. Interestingly, rats with lesions of the subthalamic nu-
cleus showed increased sign-tracking behavior (Uslaner et al., 2008),
andwe note that the effects of the IFG in stopping go responses areme-
diated by the subthalamic nucleus (Aron and Poldrack, 2006). Further-
more, the STN is recruited by the IFG when a subject rejects a default
choice (Fleming et al., 2010). This raises the possibility that the IFG, to-
gether with the subthalamic nucleus, complements an instrumental
system by allowing it to overcome the vagaries of Pavlovian inﬂuences.
An immediate question for future research would be how this comple-
mentary system is triggered if, as suggested in the current experiment,
the IFG does not appear to track action values.
Our model captured a set of Pavlovian inﬂuences over behavior,
with predictions of future reward being mandatorily associated with
go active approach, and vigor; and predictions of future loss with a
wider range of responses including no-go behavioral inhibition, and
quiescence (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cools et al., 2011; Niv et al.,
2007). Other possible substrates for these inﬂuences include the nu-
cleus accumbens and the amygdala (Cardinal et al., 2002; Parkinson
et al., 1999; Talmi et al., 2008) where dopamine plays a particularly
important role in appetitive effects (Parkinson et al., 2002). On the
other hand, serotonin is a prominent candidate for aversive effects
(Dayan and Huys, 2009; Deakin and Graeff, 1991). Indeed, tryptophan
depletion abolishes punishment induced inhibition, which is akin to
the disadvantage we observed in the go to avoid losing condition
(Crockett et al., 2009).
165M. Guitart-Masip et al. / NeuroImage 62 (2012) 154–166Our key ﬁndingwas that during a simple formof instrumental learn-
ing, healthy human volunteers showed a striking interdependence of
action and valence which exerted a corrupting effect on the course
and outcome of learning. We captured this within a computational ar-
chitecture that invoked distinct, albeit interacting, behavioral control
systems, an instrumental and a Pavlovian system. We showed that the
striatum and the SN/VTA tracked instrumental values in opposite
ways for go and no-go choices, suggesting that these value representa-
tions are bound to a regulation of vigor. Thus, our data point to intrigu-
ing functional dissociationswith these regions that enrich their putative
roles beyond that associated with the generation and report of predic-
tion errors.
Supplementary data related to this article can be found online at
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